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I. INTRODUCTION
Growth and inflation dispersions in the euro area have declined since 1990 and are now comparable to those among US states, but they are longer-lasting. As business cycles have become more synchronized after euro adoption, the contribution of the cyclical component to growth dispersions has declined. However, the contribution of the trend component has increased, partly as a result of different degrees of structural reform implementation among euro-area members (Figure 1 ). The persistence of remaining inflation dispersions has come with cost dispersions and diverging external positions (Figure 2 ). While temporary differences in inflation dynamics in a monetary union can be benign, e.g., reflecting income convergence or adjustment to country-specific shocks, they can also be associated with risks for future growth and incomes.
Accordingly, growth and inflation dispersions among euro-area countries have attracted attention. Several questions arise from a policy standpoint.
In particular, what factors are behind growth and inflation dispersions? What has been the role of the real exchange rate, the real interest rate, and the financial sector in adjustment? What role could further financial integration play in insuring against country-specific shocks that trigger dispersions?
The paper proposes to study these questions by using a variety of distinct approaches. First, the paper examines the contribution of country-specific versus asymmetrically transmitted common shocks in explaining divergences. Second, it studies the role of convergence factors in growth and inflation heterogeneity in the European Monetary Union (EMU). Third, it assesses the role of the interest rate and the housing sector in the adjustment process before and after euro introduction, using Bayesian techniques to fit a small theoretically founded model to the data. Finally, the paper analyzes the contribution of the financial system in sharing country-specific risks, by smoothing consumption and income across euro-area countries.
The analysis reveals several findings. First, growth and inflation dispersions have declined appreciably since the onset of EMU; remaining dispersions are small but persistent, relating mainly to country-specific shocks, not differences in the transmission of common shocks. Second, the different behavior of interest rates just before and after the introduction of the euro has contributed significantly to growth dispersions. However, this has been a one-off shock whose effects are declining over time. Third, and related to the interest rates shock, the construction sector has contributed to growth dispersions. Fourth, financial sector integration could do much more to insure countries against shocks and increase consumption smoothing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the findings in the literature. Section III describes the methodological approaches used in the analysis and discusses the results, while Section IV concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature has analyzed several aspects of the heterogeneity of economic performance in EMU: (i) the degree of cyclical synchronization and the role of idiosyncratic versus asymmetric propagation of common shocks; (ii) the relative importance of various transmission channels in the adjustment process, notably the role of price and wage rigidities for adjustments in competitiveness; (iii) the role of fiscal policy in divergences; and, (iv) the role of the financial sector in promoting economic convergence and improving cross-country risks sharing and consumption and income smoothing has also featured extensively.
The literature finds that cycles have become more synchronized after the launch of EMU. In particular, Giannone and Reichlin (2006) find that business cycles are similar across EMU countries and movements in outputs are mainly explained by common shocks with similar propagation mechanisms, while idiosyncratic shocks are relatively small but persistent and account for the bulk euro-area dispersions. They also note that shock propagation is more persistent in the euro area than in the United States, but that cycles are less volatile. Eickmeir (2006) also finds that, in general, output and inflation responses to common shocks (demand, supply, monetary policy, and external) across euro-area countries are similar, but long-lasting idiosyncratic shocks are responsible for output and inflation variations across countries. EC (2006) finds that country-specific shocks, including a fall in risk premia following the introduction of the euro, relaxation of credit constraints, and productivity in traded and nontraded goods are important explanatory factors for divergences.
However, despite similarities in the transmission of shocks, differences remain. For example, van den Noord (2004) finds that the decline in the interest rates after the launch of the euro had a different impact on the housing markets in the small and large countries and, via this channel, the shock has had a different effect on economic activity in the two groups. Also, Hoeller and others (2004) argue that, as the cyclical position of housing prices in the small countries may be out of line with the common monetary policy, the construction sector raises dispersions via its impact on activity.
The results in the literature suggest that the competitiveness channel dominates the adjustment process in the medium run, but operates slowly. EC (2006) finds that the procyclical effect of the real interest channel has been somewhat less important than previously thought and dominates in the initial phase of the expansion, while in the medium term adjustments in competitiveness are more important. The study also finds that wage and price rigidities influence the efficiency of the adjustment process and could lead to slow correction in competitiveness and result in protracted economic divergences.
The literature concludes that fiscal policy has contributed to the reduction of output volatility over time, but elements of procyclicality remain. Darvas and others (2005) find evidence that fiscal convergence (persistently similar GDP ratios of government balances) is associated with synchronization of business cycles. They also observe that the Maastricht fiscal criterion may have moved the EMU closer to an optimal currency area by reducing countries' scope to cause idiosyncratic shocks. Darvas and others recognize that by imposing convergence of budget deficits, the criterion could make fiscal policy less effective in counteracting asymmetric shocks, but the results suggest that the synchronization effect of fiscal policy has dominated.
The literature finds that risk sharing has increased over the past decade, but the share of idiosyncratic shocks smoothed by the financial system is significantly lower in the EMU than in the United States. In particular, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2004) find that about 10 percent of idiosyncratic (country-specific) shocks to the per capita gross domestic product of the euro area countries (over 1993-2000) are smoothed through capital markets, while 55 percent are in the United States (over 1991-1998) . Marinheiro (2003) estimates a somewhat higher share of smoothed country-specific shocks for the euro area (25 percent) but still significantly lower than in the United States. He also finds that if financial system integration in the euro area reaches the level of the United States, its contribution to smoothing idiosyncratic shocks could increase by about 20 percentage points.
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATION RESULTS

A. Common versus country-specific shocks
The relative importance of common and country-specific shocks for inflation and growth was estimated using a bi-variate VAR for each country. Specifically, two separate bi-variate VARs were estimated for each country-one for inflation and one for growth: ε is a country-specific shock. The VARs were estimated with quarterly data for two periods-pre-EMU (1980Q1-1998Q4) and EMU (1999Q1-2006Q4) . To identify the structural shocks, the euro area growth/inflation were assumed to be affected by countryspecific shocks with a lag.
The impact of common and country-specific shocks on growth and inflation was calculated using the estimated impulse response functions from the above VARs. The above systems can be rewritten in terms of the impulse response functions and the structural shocks, as follows: The main findings from the estimation results point to significantly more euro-area member country integration since the start of the currency union. The contribution of common shocks to inflation and growth has increased since the introduction of the euro (Figure 3 ). While, on average common shocks accounted for 20 percent growth and 30 percent of inflation before EMU creation, their contribution increased to around 60 percent for both growth and inflation during EMU. Also, common shocks trigger increasingly similar responses across member countries.
Next, using the above decomposition of the shocks, the contribution of country-specific shocks to growth/inflation dispersions is related to the estimated impulse response functions as follows: 2 11 21 2 12 22
This relationship was used to calculate how much of the dispersions is due to country specific shocks. Remaining growth and inflation dispersions have largely been driven by country-specific shocks since the euro introduction, not different country responses to common shocks. Country-specific shocks account for more than 70 percent of growth dispersions (with the exception of Austria, 45 percent, and Greece, 40 percent, Figure 4 ) and more than 75 percent of inflation dispersions (except Italy, 40 percent, Figure 5 ).
B. Country-specific developments and income and price level convergence
The impact of income and price level convergence on growth and inflation dispersions is assessed using two panel regressions:
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is the deviation of the price level in a member country from the euro area average at the beginning of the sample.
• For growth dispersions:
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measures the percent difference of member countries' per capita GDP from the euro-area average at the beginning of the sample. The above equations were estimated for two periods: pre-EMU (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) and EMU (1999 EMU ( -2006 Rogers (2007) concludes that the price levels of traded goods in EMU have converged mostly prior to the euro adoption, with their dispersion thereafter similar to that in the United States. At the same time, income convergence accelerated under EMU and accounted for a larger share of growth dispersions compared to the pre-EMU period. However, from a policy standpoint it is important to bear in mind that "accounting for" does not mean "causing". Accordingly, temporary rather than fundamental convergence factors could also explain the remaining growth and inflation dispersions.
C. Persistence of country-specific developments
Persistence of remaining growth and inflation dispersions is estimated using the following panel regression: 1980-1998 1999-2006 Income and Price Level Convergence and Dispersions 1/ γ particular, ECB (2005) finds that services prices and differences in wage developments have been major sources of inflation persistence, and the degree of structural reform in both services sectors and labor markets has differed noticeably among euro-area members over the past decade.
D. Shock transmission and relative importance of channels
The relative importance of the transmission channels was studied using a general equilibrium model. 2 Equations (1) - (4) represent the core of the model. ( 1) where, y t is output gap, hg t is real house prices gap, rg t is real interest rate gap, zg t is real exchange rate gap, and ŷ stands for the current period euro area output gap in a country model/the lagged output gap of a country in the euro area model. Potential output, equilibrium interest rate, equilibrium real exchange rate, and equilibrium real house prices are also defined in the model, which allows consistent estimates of the gaps within the model (for full model specification see the Appendix). (2) where, π t is inflation, z t is logarithm of real exchange rate, πˆ denotes the current period euro area inflation in a country model/the lagged inflation of a country in the euro area model, and Δ is first difference operator. where, hg t is real house prices gap. (4) where, rs t is nominal interest rate, re t is real equilibrium interest rate, and π is inflation target.
Equation (1) is an aggregate demand function, which has a lagged term to capture persistence in the data and a forward looking component as in Gali and Gertler (1999 Equation (2) is a standard open economy Phillips curve in which inflation is driven by demand conditions, exchange rate developments, and external shocks. Equation (3) defines real house price gap as a function of real interest rates. Real interest rate changes affect house prices by changing the opportunity cost of capital invested in housing, the cost of servicing mortgage credit, and the present value of future household earnings. Finally, equation (4) is a monetary policy reaction function, in which the central bank cares about inflation and output gap.
The impact of various shocks on dispersions was assessed by simulating the estimated models for each country with that for the euro area together. The interaction of area-wide and country-specific shocks takes place through the demand and supply equations in the model of the euro area and that of a member country. Area-wide demand and supply shocks are assumed to affect each country contemporaneously, while country-specific shocks are assumed to affect euro-area demand and inflation with a lag.
The simulations with the estimated models suggest that:
• The EMU-related changes in interest rates have contributed do growth divergences, accounting on average for about 25 percent of them (Figures 6).
• The impact of house prices differs across the countries reviewed and explains about 15 percent of growth dispersions (Figures 7-8 ).
E. Cross-country consumption and income smoothing
The degree of cross-country risk sharing and the role of the financial system over time was estimated using a panel regression featuring cross-country correlations of GNP/consumption conditional on output. The idea is that absence of correlation between GNP/consumption and output suggests risk sharing, e.g., via credit or capital markets. Thus,
where the deviation of per capita GNP/consumption growth of country i from the euro area (
) is regressed on the deviation of country i per capita output growth from the euro area (
), and the coefficient β t measures uninsured risk over time (β t =0 means perfect risk-sharing). To assess the contribution of the financial system, the time varying coefficient β t is specified as a function of time and the dispersion of financial development in EMU countries:
Substituting (6) into (5) 
The coefficient β 0 measures the average uninsured risk, β 1 indicates how risk-sharing evolves over time, and β 2 captures the effect of financial system. A negative β 2 coefficient lowers the degree of co-movement between consumption/GNP with output, reducing the amount of unshared risk. Equations (5) and (8) The empirical results suggest that the financial system has played a role in income (=GNP) but not in consumption risk sharing. The coefficient on the interaction of the financial system development with GDP (coefficient β 2 ) is significant for GNP, but insignificant for consumption. Also, the contribution of the financial system to risks sharing does not seem to have changed significantly over time, as the trend coefficients in both the GNP and consumption equations are insignificant.
3 The GDP share of credit of deposit money banks to the private sector was used as a proxy for financial system development. The advantage of this indicator is that it does not consider credit issued to governments, but a shortcoming is that it captures only the role of the banking system and not of other financial institutions or the securities market. However, given the dominant role of the banks in the euro area, using this indicator may not result in a large bias. In future work the following alternative indicators could be used as a cross-check: (i) liquid liabilities, comprising currency and interest-bearing liabilities of bank and non-bank financial intermediaries; (ii) stock market capitalization; and, (iii) the common component of the three measures from a principle component regression. This finding suggests that risk sharing via financial markets is better developed for investment (which accounts for much of the difference between GNP and consumption) than for household consumption. 4 One reason may be the still limited integration of retail banking in Europe. While the share of cross-border holdings of equities by euro-area residents doubled between 1997 and 2005, the median share of total assets of branches of euro-area banks that are located outside home countries remained practically unchanged at below 3 percent of all euro-area banking assets; the same figure for subsidiaries increased marginally to around 13 percent in 2005, from around 9 percent in 2001 (see ECB, 2007) . Overall, it is well known that retail banking is appreciably less well integrated than many other financial activities (among others, see Decressin et al., 2007) . The potential welfare gains from further financial integration among EMU members are substantial for each euro-area country. A comparison of the volatility of the individual euroarea members private consumption growth with the volatility of euro-area output growth suggests a high potential for additional risk sharing. Euroarea output is less volatile than consumption in each member state. Specifically, at 1.1 percentage points, the standard deviation of euro-area output growth is far lower than the maximum standard deviation of private consumption growth of around 3 percentage points and lower than the minimum standard deviation of private consumption growth of 1.2 percentage points.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Euro-area members share common shocks and their contribution to growth and inflation has increased since EMU but dispersions remain. The results of this paper suggest that inflation and growth in EMU countries are to a large extent driven by common shocks, the importance of which has increased over time. This suggests that the common monetary policy may have contributed significantly to the business-cycle synchronization and stabilization, as might have the better synchronization of fiscal policy. In particular, while common shocks explained around 30 percent of growth and inflation in euro-area members before the introduction of the euro, their contribution increased to around 60 percent after that. At the same time, common shocks increasingly trigger common responses. Accordingly, their contribution to dispersions has declined. This is important not least because it suggests that the potential for monetary policy to efficiently and effectively address common shocks has increased. The remaining dispersions are predominantly driven by country-specific shocks.
Several factors have contributed to the idiosyncratic shocks that drive remaining dispersions. One factor has been income and price level convergence. This factor could account for over 30 percent of the remaining inflation dispersions and has gained importance in growth dispersions under EMU. It will persist but its force will diminish. Another set of factors, which is not necessarily orthogonal to the first one, has been EMU-related changes in the interest rates and house price developments. This can account for 40 percent of growth divergences and may largely be of a one-off nature.
The persistence of idiosyncratic shocks raises the importance of facilitating adjustment to shocks. The functioning of the labor and product markets could be improved to foster a better operation of the competitiveness channel and higher productivity growth. The latter would facilitate faster adjustment during downturns, given downward nominal wage rigidity. Fiscal policy in the member states could absorb idiosyncratic shocks by allowing automatic stabilizers to work (see Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998) . Finally, a fully integrated financial system could serve as a powerful insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks, by allowing relatively stable consumption--funded via private rather than public borrowing and government intervention--despite fluctuations in domestic output.
Further integration of the euro-area financial system could significantly enhance income smoothing and reduce dispersions. While financial sector integration has accelerated, it has not achieved its full potential. For example, as shown in the literature and confirmed in this study, the contribution of the financial sector to income smoothing could be increased significantly--some studies suggest by 20 percentage points or more, if its level of integration reaches that of the United States. Further integration of the European capital markets can play an important role in this respect. In addition, integration of retail banking can also contribute to risk sharing, as the resulting flow of cross-country interest payments will help countries smooth idiosyncratic shocks and incomes, lowering consumption growth dispersions in the euro area. 
